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Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005)
Josh Clemons
On June 23 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion
that should be of great interest to the governments of
coastal communities that are pursuing economic devel-
opment, and to the individual citizens who make their
homes in those communities. It could affect attempts to
revitalize depressed areas and, potentially, efforts to
direct smart growth. The case, Kelo v. City of New
London, concerns the government’s power of eminent
domain - the power to take private property for public
use provided just compensation is paid to the private
owner. In Kelo the Court was faced with two questions:
what is a “public use,” and who decides when a use is
public?
The Facts of the Case
In 1990 a Connecticut state agency declared that years of
economic decline had rendered the Thames River city of
New London a “distressed municipality.”1 In 1996 con-
ditions worsened when one of the city’s major employ-
ers, the U.S. Naval Undersea Warfare Center in New
London’s Fort Trumbull area, shut its doors. In the fol-
lowing years unemployment in New London surged
while the city’s population withered to pre-War levels.
The state and local governments sought to turn the
tide by taking steps to foster economic development in
the struggling town. In January 1998 the state autho-
rized funding for economic development planning and a
Fort Trumbull State Park. The planning would be per-
formed by the New London Development Corporation
(NLDC), a private nonprofit entity under the leadership
of privately appointed directors, the purpose of which is
to assist the city in this type of planning.
The following month, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer,
Inc. announced that it would be building a $300 million
“global research facility” near Fort Trumbull. Local plan-
ners saw the Pfizer facility as having the potential to spur
an economic renaissance of the Fort Trumbull area, and
the NLDC considered it during the planning process.
In 2000, after holding neighborhood meetings and
receiving approval from the city and state, the NLDC
completed an integrated development plan for ninety
acres in the Fort Trumbull area. The plan was intended
to “complement the facility that Pfizer was going to
build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues,
encourage public access to and use of the city’s water-
front, and eventually build momentum for the revitaliza-
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Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2169
(2005)
Sabena Singh, 3L, South Texas College of Law
On June 6 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a lower
court’s decision that the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA) is altogether inapplicable to foreign ves-
sels. A plurality of the Court decided that Title III of the
ADA applies to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters,
provided the statute does not regulate a vessel’s internal
affairs.
Background
Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (NCL) is a cruise line oper-
ating foreign-flag ships departing from, and returning
to, U.S. ports. A lawsuit under Title III of the ADA
arose on account of discrimination allegations by dis-
abled individuals and their companions who purchased
tickets for round-trip NCL cruises. Title III of the ADA
prohibits discrimination based on disability in places of
“public accommodation” and in “specified public trans-
portation services,” and requires covered entities to
make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures” to accommodate disabled persons, and to
remove “architectural barriers, and communication bar-
riers that are structural in nature” where such removal is
readily achievable.”1
The allegations against NCL maintained that the
cruise line charged disabled passengers higher fares and
required disabled passengers to pay special surcharges;
maintained evacuation programs and equipment in loca-
tions not accessible to disabled individuals; required dis-
abled individuals, but not other passengers, to waive any
potential medical liability and to travel with a compan-
ion; and reserved the right to remove from the ship any
disabled individual whose presence endangered the
“comfort” of the other passengers.2 More generally, the
petitioners alleged that respondent NCL “failed to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and pro-
cedures” necessary to ensure the petitioners’ full enjoy-
ment of the services respondent offered.3 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title III does not
apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters because
of the presumption that absent a clear indication of con-
gressional intent, general statutes do not apply to for-
eign-flag ships. The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion
reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment, with Justice
Scalia dissenting. 
Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court determined that as long as Title III
does not attempt to regulate a vessel’s internal affairs, the
statute is applicable to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S.
waters. Several of the petitioners’ claims involved
requirements that could have been viewed as relating to
internal ship affairs, so the Court speculated on the
necessity of applying the “clear statement” rule which
holds that a clear statement of congressional intent is
necessary before a general statutory requirement can
interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel’s
internal affairs and operations. The Court determined
that “[w]hile the clear statement rule could limit Title
III’s application to foreign-flag cruise ships in some
instances, when it requires removal of physical barriers, it
would appear the rule is inapplicable to many other
duties Title III might impose.”4
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Further, the Court’s previous case law supported
the finding that general statutes are presumed to
apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreign-
flag vessel in U.S. territory if the interests of the U.S.
or its citizens, rather than interests internal to the
ship, are at risk.
Rejecting the Fifth
Circuit’s hold-
ing that Title III
does not apply
to fore ign f lag
vessels, the Supreme
Court decided that it
would be a “harsh and
unexpected interpreta-
tion of a statute de-
signed to provide
broad protec-
tion for the
disabled.”5
The
Court exam-
ined the pe-
t i t i o n e r s ’
a l l ega t ions
and found
that most of
the Title III
violations impli-
cated a require-
ment that would
interfere with the inter-
nal affairs and management
of a vessel. The part of petitioners’ alle-
gations that appeared to involve the inter-
nal affairs of the vessel was found in the
claim concerning physical barriers to access on board.
The Court found that a requirement of removal of these
barriers would mandate a permanent and significant
alteration to the ship’s basic construction, and therefore
would likely interfere with the internal affairs of the for-
eign ship.
Title III requires barrier removal only if it is “readi-
ly achievable,” and the statute further defines that term
as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out
without much difficulty or expense.”6 The Court rea-
soned that Congress would not have intended for Title
III’s barrier removal requirement to have a substantial
impact on its operation or to bring vessels into non-
compliance with international legal obligations.
Further, the Court concluded that a structural modifi-
cation is not readily achievable within the statute’s
meaning if it would pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of others. In light of this, the Court stated that it
may follow that Title III does not require any perma-
nent and significant structural modifications that inter-
fere with the internal affairs of any cruise ship, foreign-
flag or domestic; in that case, recourse to the clear state-
ment rule would not be necessary. 
Conclusion
While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and Justice Scalia in his dissent, agree that
general statutes do not apply to for-
eign-flag ships in U.S. waters,
the Supreme Court’s  case
law stands for the
proposition that
general statutes are
merely presumed
not to impose
requirements that
would interfere
with the
internal
affairs
of for-
eign-flag
vessels. They
d e t e r m i n e d
that “Title III’s
own limitations
and qualifications
prevent the statute
from imposing requirements
that would conflict with inter-
national obligations or threaten shipboard
safety.”7 Therefore, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
Endnotes
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(A)(iv)-
(v); 12184(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(C).
2. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2169,
2179 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2175.
5. Id. at 2179.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
7. Spector, at 2184.
Patterson v. Allseas USA, Inc., No. 04-40949, 2005 WL
1350594 (5th Cir. June 8, 2005)
Emily Plett-Miyake, 3L, Vermont Law School
In June, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that Allseas Marine Contractors SA (AMC) did
not have a duty to warn Eddie Patterson, an AMC super-
intendent, of the dangers of walking down slippery stairs
on a ship in wet boots. They reversed the judgment of
the District Court, which awarded the plaintiff damages
for injuries sustained at work, and rendered judgment
for AMC.
Background
Eddie Patterson began working for AMC in September
1997 as a superintendent on Solitaire, the largest pipe-
laying vessel in the world. Two years later he was trans-
ferred to the Lorelay, where he was one of the highest
ranking members of the ship’s crew, answering only to
the captain. Patterson controlled all aspects of pipe con-
struction and pipe-laying aboard the Lorelay, supervised
about 75 percent of the vessel’s four hundred-person
crew, and was a member of both the Vessel Management
Team, which was responsible for the safety of the ship,
and the Safety, Health and Environmental Committee,
with duties including touring the ship to look for poten-
tial safety hazards. The position that Patterson held as
superintendent is highly specialized, and based on the
degree of experience required, only an estimated fifty
people in the world are qualified to hold the post.
On July 12, 2000, as part of his AMC Safety, Health
and Environmental Committee duties, Patterson, along
with the captain and safety representatives from the con-
tracting oil company, conducted a safety tour of the ves-
sel. The group was inspecting the vessel’s stern deck,
requiring them to ascend the starboard crossover stair-
way, where the accident giving rise to this lawsuit took
place. While on the deck, Patterson observed standing
water on the port crossover deck and decided to inspect
it. After the tour, Patterson and one of his subordinates,
a barge foreman named Jerry Williamson, inspected the
standing water. In order to reach the crossover deck they
used the port stairway. While the stairway originally had
both inboard and outboard handrails, the outboard
handrail was removed before the accident in 1999 to
allow access to the outrigger deck.
After reaching the standing water, the men walked
around in it in order to determine the best way to
remove it from the deck. With dripping wet boots they
began descending the port stairway. Williamson was in
the lead, using the inboard handrail. Patterson followed
but did not use the handrail in his descent. Patterson
slipped and fell into Williamson about halfway down the
stairs. Williamson managed to remain upright and, mak-
ing good use of the handrail, prevented the pair from
tumbling down the remainder of the stairs. Patterson
went to see the ship’s medic, complaining of back pain.
He left the Lorelay and sought treatment from a chiro-
practor who had seen him in the past, and who testified
that while Patterson suffered from significant back prob-
lems in the past, they were significantly worse after the
fall. Patterson has undergone several surgeries in connec-
tion with his condition.
District Court Decision
Patterson filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas against Allseas USA, Inc.,
Allseas Marine Services, NV, and AMC under the Jones
Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) and general maritime law, and
asserted an action in rem against the Lorelay.1 He argued
that his injuries were caused by AMC’s negligence in the
construction and maintenance of the Lorelay’s port
crossover deck and stairway, and that the dangerous con-
dition of the port crossover deck and stairway rendered
the vessel unseaworthy.
The district court dismissed Patterson’s claims of
unseaworthiness entirely, finding that it was common
practice to descend stairs using only one handrail, that
the stairs were not excessively worn to the point of creat-
ing a dangerous condition, and, significantly, noting
Williamson’s ability to stay afoot while blocking the fall
of his less surefooted boss. The court also dismissed all
parties except AMC and Lorelay, the only two parties
that could be held liable under the Jones Act.
The next question that the court addressed was
whether Patterson could recover under the Jones Act.
Because the court had already found that AMC was not
negligent in designing, constructing, or maintaining
the port crossover deck and stairway, it examined
whether there was a duty to warn Patterson. The court
imposed liability against AMC for failure to warn, find-
ing that Williamson had a “very high duty with regard
to safety”2 and should have warned Patterson of “the
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dangers associated with descending the port stairway
with wet boots.”3 Assessing the comparative fault in the
situation, the court decreased the judgment against
AMC by 65 percent after finding that “Patterson
descended the stairway with less caution than a reason-
ably prudent seaman.”4 Patterson was awarded
$368,010.23 after accounting for his comparative fault.
AMC appealed.
Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals found that the District Court
erred in concluding that Williamson had a duty to
warn Patterson of the dangers associated with walking
down a steep vessel stairway in wet boots. AMC prop-
erly argued that under the Jones Act, “a shipowner only
has a duty to warn seamen of ‘dangers not reasonably
known’ and cannot be liable for failing to warn of an
‘open and obvious danger.’”5 The court here agreed
with AMC that the dangers in the situation leading to
Patterson’s injury were of an open and obvious nature,
and that there was therefore no duty to warn. Patterson,
Williamson’s superior, was the main safety official
under the captain on the vessel, and was very familiar
with the vessel. He should have known, as both a safe-
ty official and a man of common sense, of the dangers
of the activity upon which he chose to embark. 
Conclusion
The court recognized that “[n]othing Williamson knew
or could have told Patterson regarding the dangers of
descending the stairway in wet boots would have armed
Patterson with any more knowledge than he had when
he walked out of the standing water toward the stair-
way,”6 found that the district court erred as a matter of
law in finding Williamson and AMS negligent and vic-
ariously liable, respectively, and reversed the judgment
against them.
Endnotes
1. An action in rem determines the title to property
(here, the Lorelay) and the rights of the parties with
respect to that property.
2. Patterson v. Allseas USA, Inc., No. 04-40949, 2005 WL
1350594 at *3 (5th Cir. June 8, 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *4.
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Sweet Pea Marine, LTD. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d
1242 (11th Cir. 2005)
Jonathan P. Lew, 2L, Roger Williams University School
of Law
In June the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit refused to apply a maritime lien to a yacht after
a contract dispute, finding that such liens encumber
commerce and should be strictly construed. In a case
involving the remodeling of the yacht Sweet Pea, the
court found that the party enforcing the lien failed to
prove that the prices it was charging the vessel owner for
products were reasonable. This reasonable price element
was also necessary to prove the breach of a maritime con-
tract claim, which failed as well. 
Background 
Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. (Sweet Pea) contracted with APJ
Marine, Inc. (APJ), to outfit and remodel the 127-foot
pleasure yacht Sweet Pea. The contract included pay
scales for labor, including skilled laborers at $56/hour,
semi-skilled laborers at $36/hour, and unskilled laborers
at $26/hour. In addition, the contract authorized APJ to
add a 15 percent mark-up to the cost of materials and
supplies bought for the job. Problems arose when Sweet
Pea discovered that unskilled workers were used and
billed as skilled workers at a much higher cost. As a
result, Sweet Pea terminated the contract in November
2001. In March 2002, APJ sent Sweet Pea a bill for out-
standing costs; Sweet Pea refused to pay and this lawsuit
commenced.
Sweet Pea filed a complaint in federal court against
APJ for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation,
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties. APJ responded,
claiming breach of an oral maritime contract and request-
ing a maritime lien be placed on the Sweet Pea. The dis-
trict court found for APJ and awarded the company
$244,000 for the 15 percent mark-up for goods and
materials it purchased. The district court also imposed a
maritime lien on the vessel in the same amount.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court’s holding for APJ, finding that the company failed
to prove that the prices it paid for the marked-up materi-
als were reasonable. According to the court, by granting
APJ’s claims the district court overlooked the reasonable
price element, which is essential to both the breach of
contract claim and the maritime lien. 
Maritime Lien Claim
The Federal Maritime Lien Act provides a maritime lien
on a vessel to a person that provides necessaries at a rea-
sonable price to a vessel if the services are maritime in
nature and facilitate the “vessel’s use in navigation or
maritime commerce.”1 Here, APJ’s contract to remodel
the Sweet Pea is sufficient because “there is no question
that necessaries as defined in the Federal Maritime Act
specifically include vessel repairs.”2 However, APJ failed
to prove that the materials it purchased for remodeling
the Sweet Pea were purchased at a reasonable price.
The Eleventh Circuit viewed the district court’s
judgment as “clearly erroneous” because APJ failed to
prove that the prices it had paid for materials used on the
Sweet Pea were reasonable according to industry custom
and in accord with prevailing charges for the work done
and the materials furnished.3 APJ did not present any
evidence to show that the prices submitted to Sweet Pea
were reasonable. In its defense, APJ argued that Sweet
Pea waived its ability to contest reasonableness by agree-
ing to the 15 percent mark-up on materials purchased.
But the circuit court found this argument unpersuasive
because an agreement to a mark-up does not indicate a
reasonable price. Even though the 15 percent mark-up
may be standard for the industry, this fact alone did not
establish that the underlying prices were reasonable.
Moreover, testimony that the labor rates used were
industry standard also had no bearing on the reasonable-
ness for the prices of the goods and materials. Thus,
without any direct evidence of reasonable price (such as
testimony that the price paid by APJ was industry stan-
dard for goods) the Eleventh Circuit refused to award
APJ the maritime lien.
Maritime Contract Claim
The reasonable price element was essential to both of
APJ’s maritime claims. For APJ to recover on its claim
that an oral contract regarding the repair of a vessel was
breached it had to prove the terms of the maritime con-
tract, the breach, and the reasonable value of the pur-
ported damages.4 Consequently, APJ’s failure to prove
Court Grants No Leniency for Maritime
Lien Claim
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reasonable price had a conclusive effect on its maritime
lien claim. 
Diversity of Jurisdiction
Finally, the court found that jurisdiction in the federal
district court was proper. APJ invoked admiralty juris-
diction when it claimed its oral contract with Sweet Pea
was breached. The U.S. Constitution grants federal
courts original jurisdiction in all civil cases involving
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.5 A maritime contract
is defined to be one having reference to commerce or
navigation. The particular element essential to give it a
maritime character is direct connection with commercial
transactions or navigation.6 Because APJ’s contract
involved the repairing of the Sweet Pea, the admiralty
jurisdiction requirement was met.7
Conclusion
Maritime liens were created to grant a vessel credit in
order for her to complete her voyage; thus the lien was
created for the benefit of the vessel, not the benefit of the
creditor.8 The completion of her voyage remained para-
mount to any individual debt a vessel might accrue.
Here, the Eleventh Circuit strictly construed the
Federal Maritime Lien Act because the maritime lien was
not offered as credit to Sweet Pea so it could continue on
its voyage. Rather, the lien acted as an insurance policy
for APJ so the company could be guaranteed compensa-
tion. APJ’s failure to proffer any direct evidence in regard
to the reasonable price element of both maritime claims
was clearly erroneous and granting an award and a mar-
itime lien would impede the vessel’s ability to participate
in commerce.
Endnotes
1. 46 U.S.C. § 31342; E.S. Binnings, Inc. v. M/V Saudi
Riyadh, 815 F.2d 660, 666 (11th Cir. 1987).
2. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. M/V HER AN,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6809 (D.La. 1998).
3. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 77 (U.S. 1877); Shelley
Tractor & Equip. Co. v. The Boots, 140 F.Supp. 425,
426 (E.D.N.C. 1956).
4. See Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S.
603, 605-06 (U.S. 1991).
5. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. See Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 853
F.2d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1988).
7. Repair of a ship is distinguished from construction of
a ship because until a vessel is completed and
launched it does not become a ship in the legal sense
and cannot become in “direct connection with com-
mercial transactions or navigation.” Id.
8. In re Hydraulic Steam Dredge, 80 F. 545 (7th Cir.
1897).
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tion of the rest of the city.”2 The plan envisioned a “small
urban village” with a waterfront conference hotel, restau-
rants, and shopping; marinas for recreational and com-
mercial use; a “riverwalk” connecting the various areas of
the development; approximately eighty new residences; a
U.S. Coast Guard Museum; office space; and parking.3
Unfortunately for the planners, the ninety acres were
neither vacant nor unowned. The city therefore autho-
rized the NLDC to acquire the property either by out-
right purchase or exercise of the city’s eminent domain
(condemnation) power. NLDC was able to negotiate for
the purchase of most of the property from willing sellers;
however, nine property owners refused to sell voluntari-
ly. Some of these owners occupied homes on their prop-
erties, while others held lots for investment purposes.
One woman, Wilhelmina Dery, had lived in her house
since she was born there in 1918. Her husband Charles
had lived there with her since they married sixty years
ago. The landowners were holding out not for more
money, but because they wanted to keep their property.
To overcome the landowners’ refusal to sell volun-
tarily, the NLDC exercised the eminent
domain power to take the land upon
payment of just compensation. The
landowners sued on the grounds that
the anticipated economic development
of the Fort Trumbull area was not a
“public use” for eminent domain purpos-
es. The trial court ruled in favor of the
landowners with respect to some of the
properties, and in favor of the City with
respect to the rest. The case was
appealed to the Connecticut
Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of
the City and upheld the exercise of emi-
nent domain on all the properties.
The Law
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” This “Takings Clause” gives
rise to two kinds of legal conflicts: whether the compen-
sation is just, and whether the use is public. Kelo
involved the latter conflict.
Historically there has been little genuine controversy
over the government’s power to exercise eminent domain
over (i.e., condemn) property for such obviously public
uses as roads, parks, and airports. In those instances the
land remains owned and managed by the government or
a quasi-governmental entity and is not transferred into
private ownership. The public also has the right to use
the property.
Sometimes, however, a government plan involves
condemned property being transferred to private owner-
ship. This situation is far more problematic. Since 1798
it has been a legal maxim that the government cannot
pass a “law that takes property from A and gives it to B.”4
In other words, the Takings Clause limits the govern-
ment’s power to exercise eminent domain over one per-
son’s private property and transfer it to another private
party, even if just compensation is paid. The Supreme
Court has stated that “the Constitution forbids even a
compensated taking of property when executed for no
reason other than to confer a private benefit on a partic-
ular private party.”5
Yet the clause does not entirely prohibit transfers of
condemned property to private parties. In the 19th cen-
tury, for example, the government condemned a great
deal of private land to facilitate the building of railroads.
The land was transferred to privately-owned railroad
companies. Nonetheless, the purpose of the transfer was
to benefit the public; the railroads were common carriers
that would be available for use by all. So,
while the transfer was from private party
A to private party B, the use to be made
of the land was considered public. It was
at this time that the meaning of “public
use” began to be broadened to encom-
pass what would be more accurately
thought of as “public purpose.”
Problems arise when condemned
land is transferred to private ownership
for purposes that are less straightfor-
wardly public than railroad lines. The
two landmark Supreme Court cases in
this area are Berman v. Parker6 and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.7 In
Berman the District of Columbia autho-
rized the condemnation of private property
for the redevelopment of blighted urban areas, with some
property going to plainly public uses like schools and
streets and other property going to private developers for,
among other things, the construction of low-cost hous-
ing. Berman was a department store owner who chal-
lenged the condemnation of his store, which was not
itself considered “blighted,” on the grounds that redevel-
oping the surrounding blighted community was not a
valid public use. 
A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed. The Court’s
opinion expressed two principles: first, that the concept
of “public use” encompasses a wide range of possible
activities; and second, that legislatures are the appropri-
Supreme Court, from page 1
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ate bodies to decide whether a use is public or not, and
courts should refrain from second-guessing them.
Midkiff dealt with a very unusual fact situation in
Hawaii. The feudal land ownership system in place prior
to statehood had resulted in land ownership being con-
centrated in an astonishingly small group of owners: 47
percent of the state’s land was owned by seventy-two
individuals. On Oahu, the most populous of the state’s
islands, 72.5 percent of all fee simple titles were in the
hands of only twenty-two owners. The state legislature
determined that this land oligopoly was powerfully detri-
mental to the public welfare and passed a statute that
would enable the vast estates to be condemned and
passed to other private owners.
The Court upheld this statute as well. In her major-
ity opinion Justice O’Connor reaffirmed the principles
of Berman: in these cases courts should defer to legisla-
tures “where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose” unless
“the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.”8
On the spectrum of judicial deference to legislatures, this
standard is as deferential as it gets. As for whether a use
is adequately public, the bar is also set very low: it need
only be “conceivable” that the purpose is a public one.
Berman and Midkiff, and a few similar cases, provid-
ed the legal underpinnings for Kelo.
The Kelo Decision
The principles expressed in Berman and Midkiff posed
an enormous obstacle to the holdout landowners of Fort
Trumbull, who were in the position of attempting to
convince the Court that economic redevelopment of the
area could not conceivably be a public purpose. Not sur-
prisingly, in light of its earlier cases, the Court rejected
the landowners’ arguments. The Court, noting the
extensive deliberation that went into the plan and the
state statute that authorized it, held that the “plan
unquestionably serves a public purpose” and that eco-
nomic development in general is no less a public purpose
than the government activities the Court had upheld
before.9 The fact that private parties would also benefit
did not render the purpose of the condemnation non-
public. The Court also rejected the landowners’ request
that there be a “reasonable certainty” that public benefits
will accrue from the plan, noting that such a heightened
standard of review would be incongruous with Midkiff.10
Ultimately, the Court noted, it is up to the state legisla-
tures to rein in their states’ use of eminent domain.
In short, the majority made a straightforward deci-
sion that is in line with its established precedent.
Nonetheless, four of the nine justices dissented. The
nationwide controversy generated by this case, the out-
come of which to many defies common sense,  makes it
worthwhile to examine the two written dissents, by
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, in some detail.
Justice O’Connor’s Dissent
It may be surprising that Justice O’Connor, author of the
Midkiff decision, dissented from an opinion that drew so
heavily upon her earlier opinion. Why did she reason dif-
ferently in Kelo?
O’Connor distinguishes Berman and Midkiff from
Kelo by noting that the condemnation in each of the ear-
lier cases was undertaken to cure an “affirmative harm on
society” – urban blight in Berman, the corrosive results of
oligopoly in Midkiff.11 In her view a taking that alleviates
a public harm provides a direct benefit to the public and
is constitutional, whereas a taking that is merely intend-
ed to provide indirect benefits by increasing the eco-
nomic productivity of the condemned property is
unconstitutional. She argues that allowing the condem-
nation of property for transfer to private parties for noth-
ing more than economic development does not ade-
quately constrain the eminent domain power; in her
words, “[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing
any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shop-
ping mall, or any farm with a factory.”12 While this state-
ment is a bit of an exaggeration – takings that provide
purely private benefits for private parties remain uncon-
stitutional – her core point is a compelling one. If a gov-
ernment body can justify any taking with some indirect,
incidental, and possibly even uncertain public benefit,
then the “public use” requirement imposes very little
limit on the exercise of eminent domain. While
O’Connor acknowledges that Berman and Midkiff laid
the groundwork for Kelo, she also contends that the rea-
soning in those cases should not have led to this result.
Justice Thomas’ Dissent
Justice Thomas, who in his career has not written prolifi-
cally, penned a lengthy dissent that digs deeper into the
constitutional fundamentals than the other written opin-
ions. Thomas is known for having less respect for the
principle of adhering to precedent than other justices and
here he makes a case for rejecting the established idea that
“public use” may be defined as “public purpose.” The
crux of Thomas’ argument is that “public use” is limited
to situations where “the government owns, or the public
has a legal right to use, the property.”13
Thomas begins his argument with a discussion of the
text and common law background of the Constitution,
and the use of eminent domain in the early days of the
See Supreme Court, page 10
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republic. These factors, according to Thomas, demon-
strate that the original intent of the Public Use Clause was
to describe a much smaller universe of public uses than is
included under the current “public purpose” definition.
While persuasive, this argument is not ultimately
conclusive because original intent is notoriously difficult,
if not impossible, to identify. Thomas is on firmer
ground when he exposes the flaws in the lines of cases
that led up to Berman and Midkiff. He asserts that the
expansive “public purpose” definition has developed
from misuse of non-legally binding language in an 1896
case,14 an error which has compounded over time in sub-
sequent cases. Likewise, Thomas declares that the notion
that it is up to the legislature to decide whether a use is
public has grown from overbroad language in a different
1896 case15 that has been incorporated into later deci-
sions without proper examination.
Thomas’ strongest argument may be that there is no
reason to believe that the Supreme Court should defer to
legislative determinations of “public use” when it does
not, and should not, defer to the legislature on the reach
of other constitutional protections. For example, the
Court will not defer to a legislative determination that a
search or seizure is reasonable (4th Amendment), or a
punishment is not cruel and unusual (8th Amendment),
or a citizen is receiving due process of law (5th and 14th
Amendments). If the Bill of Rights was intended to be a
judicially-protected limit on the power of the legislative
branch to infringe upon certain inalienable rights, why
should courts defer to legislatures with respect to this
one? Thomas believes that such an outcome is illogical.
Conclusion
Kelo began generating controversy as soon as the decision
was issued. Many people were outraged at the notion
that their government could take their homes simply
because the land upon which they sit could be utilized in
a way that is more economically beneficial to the public,
compensation notwithstanding. In their dissenting opin-
ions Justices Thomas and O’Connor both warn that the
consequences of this decision may fall most heavily on
poor and/or minority communities that lack the political
clout of large corporations and real estate developers.
These fears may be well-founded; time will tell.
Nonetheless, much of the rhetoric this decision has
spawned has inaccurately represented it as a bizarre legal
aberration. That is to be expected given the vitriolic
modern political climate and the particularly stark facts
of the case. Yet nothing could be further from the truth.
Kelo is a logical continuation of the reasoning of Berman
and Midkiff; opinions written, respectively, by Justices
William O. Douglas and O’Connor – neither of whom
could reasonably be considered a wild-eyed radical.16
Kelo may square with Supreme Court precedent, but
the public attention it has focused on the eminent
domain issue is likely to have effects at the state level
nonetheless. As Justice Stevens, who acknowledged the
“hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstand-
ing the payment of just compensation,” noted, state leg-
islatures have the authority to restrict the exercise of emi-
nent domain by state and local government entities.17
Prior to Kelo, eight states - Arkansas, Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Montana, South Carolina and
Washington - already forbade the use of eminent domain
for economic redevelopment purposes unless necessary
to remove blight. The public outcry in response to Kelo
is pushing other state legislatures to follow suit.18
Endnotes
1.    Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2658
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8.   Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
9.   Kelo at 2665-66.
10. Id. at 2667.
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14. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
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15. U.S. v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
16. Adherence to precedent is a keystone of our legal system.
It is ironic that the Kelo majority, generally considered
the more politically liberal justices, followed this most
conservative of legal principles while a leading member
of the politically conservative wing of the Court, Justice
Thomas, advocated overturning established precedent
and weakening legislative power in favor of the judiciary
– an approach often decried by political conservatives as
“judicial activism.”
17. Kelo at 2668.
18. See e.g. Ala. H. 186, Reg. Sess. 2005 (Feb. 1, 2005) (bill
sponsored by Rep. Jack Venable, D-Tallassee, prohibiting
municipalities from condemning property for commer-
cial retail development, which failed to pass the Senate).
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Continental Ins. Co. v. Roberts, No. 04-12566, 2005
WL 1313692 (11th Cir. June 3, 2005)
Emily Plett-Miyake, 3L, Vermont Law School
In June, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the term “household” as found in an insurance policy’s
family member limitation clause is ambiguous. Applying
the Florida legal principle that “an ambiguous insurance
contract is construed against the insurer,”1 the court
affirmed the trial court and held that the insured boat
operator and her injured passenger were entitled to an
interpretation requiring a relationship by blood, marriage,
or adoption in order for the claim amount to be limited.
Background
In July of 2001, Stephen Gimopoulos dove headfirst off
Polly Roberts’ boat into shallow water. He suffered severe
spinal injuries and became a quadriplegic. Gimopoulos
filed a claim under Roberts’ Continental Insurance
Company boater’s insurance policy. The policy’s liability
provision provided $100,000 in coverage for “bodily
injuries arising out of operation of the boat.” Coverage
was limited, however, to $25,000 for “any member of the
named insured’s household.” The term “household” was
not defined in the policy, and Gimopoulos filed for the
full $100,000.
Continental Insurance Company investigated
Gimopoulos’ claim and discovered that he and Roberts
had been living together in an intimate relationship for
twenty months. They shared meals and expenses, and
Gimopoulos carried a cellular phone and a credit card in
Roberts’ name. Continental believed that Gimopoulos
was a member of Roberts’ “household,” and that his
claim was therefore subject to the family member limita-
tion clause. Based on this belief, Continental offered
$25,000 for the claim. Gimopoulos believed otherwise,
however, and did not accept Continental’s offer.
District Court Decision
In June of 2003, Continental filed a lawsuit against
Gimopoulos and Roberts, seeking, among other things,
a declaration that Gimopoulos was entitled to the limit-
ed amount under the policy because he had been a mem-
ber of Roberts’ “household” at the time of the accident.
Continental based its claim on the premise that the word
“household,” as used in the policy, “included all people
living together in one dwelling regardless of whether they
were related by blood, marriage, or adoption.”
Continental argued that since it was undisputed that
Gimopoulos and Roberts lived together, then it clearly
followed that Gimopoulos was a member of Roberts’
household.
Roberts and Gimopoulos disagreed, however,
responding that the word “household,” as used in the
insurance contract, was limited to people who shared a
dwelling “who were also related by blood, marriage, or
adoption.” As Gimopoulos is not related to Roberts in
any of those ways, they argued that he was not a member
of her “household” and was thus entitled to full coverage.
The district court granted Gimopoulos and Roberts’
motion for summary judgment. It found that both inter-
pretations of “household” were reasonable in light of dic-
tionary definitions. However, because of Florida com-
mon law and the context of the term’s use in an insur-
ance policy, the court found that the contract term was
ambiguous and as a result had to be construed in favor
of the insured. Based on this, the court ruled that
Gimopoulos and Roberts were not members of a “house-
hold” and thus not subject to the limitation clause of the
insurance policy. Continental appealed.
Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. At the
outset, both parties agreed on several things: that Florida
law governs the interpretation of “household” in this
context, that if the term “household” is ambiguous it
must be construed against Continental, that the term
“household” is ambiguous if more than one reasonable
interpretation exists, and that Continental’s interpreta-
tion of the term “household” is reasonable. The only
question before the court, then, was “whether the inter-
pretation of ‘household’ offered by Gimopoulos and
Roberts is also reasonable.”
Housemates Do Not a
Household Make
Insurance Company Liable for Boyfriend’s Injuries
See Continental,  page 14
Stock photograph from the ©Nova Development Corp. Collection
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Josh Clemons
If you have ever looked out the window during an
airplane flight over one of the South’s many mean-
dering rivers, you have probably seen an oxbow
lake. An oxbow lake is formed when a meander –
one of the “hairpin curves” - in a river or stream is
cut off from the main channel by an avulsion.
Oxbow lakes are common in Mississippi on rivers
including the Mississippi and the Pearl. Typically
they are hydrologically connected to, and seasonal-
ly rise and fall with, the river that birthed them.
Oxbow lakes can provide outstanding fishing
and hunting opportunities; for that reason, private
individuals and groups sometimes seek to exclude
the public from oxbows that they claim are private
property. Can they do this, or are the state’s oxbow
lakes public waters?
The Law Pertaining to Public
Waters
The public has the right to
use public waters for boating,
fishing, and other uses. The
Mississippi statutes define
“public waterways” in such a
way that it appears that only
flowing streams can be pub-
lic.1 However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court in Dycus v.
Sillers observed that the
statutory definition does not
necessarily exclude other
types of waters, such as lakes,
from the legal status of “pub-
lic waters.”2 While discussing
the oxbow Lake Beulah in
Bolivar County in that case,
the court suggested that all
oxbow l ake s  a re  pub l i c
waters, and that members of the public accordingly
have the right to use them “to [their] heart’s con-
tent, subject only to a like use by others and rea-
sonable regulation by the state.”3 The court even
went so far as to declare that “the public right to
waters formed by an avulsion is as great as any
other public waters.”4
Other cases, as well as opinions of the
Mississippi Attorney General, support the Dycus
view that oxbow lakes are public waters. In State
Game and Fish Commission v. Louis Fritz Co. the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the private
riparian owner of over 90 percent of the lands
beneath a lake could not exclude a state contractor,
who gained lawful access to the lake from another
riparian landowner, from clearing the lake of preda-
tory fish.5 While the case appears to involve an
oxbow lake (South Horn Lake in DeSoto County),
the court did not explicitly address the public/pri-
vate status of the lake; rather, it held that anyone
who gains lawful access to a lake (that is, who does
not trespass to get there) may make use of the sur-
face of the lake for boating and fishing so long as
they do not interfere with similar use by others who
are entitled to use the lake. A riparian landowner
may own the bed and banks of a natural lake, but
he does not own the water or the fish in it.6 The
Are Mississippi’s
Oxbow Lakes 
Public Waters?
Photograph of oxbow lakes courtesy of USFG
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state owns the water and fish for the common ben-
efit of all its citizens.
In 1991 the Mississippi Supreme Court decid-
ed in Ryals v. Pigott that the Bogue Chitto River is
a public waterway.7 The portion of the river in
question did not meet the statutory mean annual
flow requirement; nonetheless, the court found it
to be a public waterway because it is “navigable in
fact.”8 The court rejected as too restrictive the
obsolete “steamboat carrying two hundred bales of
cotton” definition of navigability found in Miss.
Code § 51-1-1. Instead, a water body is “navigable
in fact” if it can be navigated by “loggers, fisher-
men and pleasure boaters.”9 The court indicates
that lakes, as well as streams, can be navigable
waters under the law.10 Waters that are navigable in
fact are subject to public use under the Equal
Footing and Public Trust doctrines.
Under the Equal Footing Doctrine (erroneous-
ly referred to in Ryals as the “Equal Footings
Doctrine”), the title to the beds and banks of nav-
igable streams passed to newly-formed states at
statehood.11 States may, with some restrictions,
pass title to these lands to private landowners, but
the public retains the right to use the navigable
waters for commerce, fishing, and boating under
the Public Trust Doctrine.12 The Ryals court
observed that this public right cannot be with-
drawn “by legislative enactment or judicial
decree.”13 In other words, the legislature can sell or
give away the land under navigable waters but it
cannot sell or give away the public’s right to use
those waters.
None of these cases explicitly decided the pub-
lic/private status of an oxbow lake. However, when
the cases are read together their reasoning suggests
very strongly that the Mississippi Supreme Court,
if squarely presented with the issue, would consid-
er oxbow lakes to be public waters. This view seems
to be shared by the Mississippi Attorney General’s
office, which has issued several opinion letters on
the subject. In a 1993 letter to the Mississippi
Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks the
Attorney General quoted with approval the lan-
guage in Dycus that indicates that all oxbow lakes
are public.1 4 In separate opinions for the
Mississippi Gaming Commission, the Attorney
General declared that oxbow lakes are navigable.15
These letters provide additional strong support for
the position that oxbow lakes are public waterways.
Prescription
The Dycus court declared that, even if they are not
otherwise “navigable” or “public,” oxbow lakes
may become public waters by the doctrine of pre-
scription.16 Under the doctrine of prescription,
private property may become public if it is used
“under a claim of right, openly, notoriously, peace-
fully, continuously and uninterruptedly for in
excess of ten years.”17
Conclusion
The relevant law strongly indicates that oxbow
lakes that were formed by navigable rivers or pub-
lic waterways are public waters. Therefore, a
member of the public has a right to use them for,
at the very least, boating and fishing, provided he
or she does not have to trespass across private land
to get there.
Endnotes
1.   Miss. Code § 51-1-4.
2.   557 So.2d 486, 499, n. 65 (Miss. 1990).
3.   Id. at 501. This statement is not binding law
because the public/private status of oxbow lakes
was not the issue before the court in that case.
However, the statement does signal how the
court might rule if that were the issue.
4.   Id. at 503.
5.   187 Miss. 539 (1940).
6.   This rule does not apply to man-made lakes,
such as catfish farms.
7.   580 So.2d 1140 (Miss. 1991).
8.   Id. at 1152.
9.   Id.
10. Id. at 1151 (“At the time the constitution was
adopted commerce by navigable waters, such as
rivers, lakes, bayous and canals was much more
common than now…”) (emphasis added).
11. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (U.S. 1845).
12. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(U.S. 1892).
13. Ryals at 1149.
14. Miss. Atty. Gen. Op. 1993-0836 (Dec. 6,
1993).
15. Miss. Atty. Gen. Ops. 1992-0036 (May 18,
1992), 1993-0539 (July 14, 1993).
16. Dycus at 501.
17. Id.
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The court found ample evidence in Florida case law
to support Gimopoulos and Roberts’ interpretation of
“household.” The reasonableness of their interpretation
was further supported by dictionary definitions and
common usage. The court found that “Gimopoulos and
Roberts do not need to show that their interpretation of
the term ‘household’ in this insurance contract is the cor-
rect one. All they need to show is that the term is
ambiguous, and the existence of two competing, reason-
able interpretations establishes ambiguity.” Florida legal
principles hold that when there is ambiguity in an insur-
ance contract, the ambiguity should be construed against
the insurer.
Continental then asked that the court certify to the
Florida Supreme Court the question of what “household”
means under Florida law. The court declined to do so,
finding that the actual definition was not the question on
which the appeal turned. “The question is not what the
term truly means, but whether there was enough doubt
about its true meaning to bring into play the principle
that where there is ambiguity the insured wins.”
One member of the court disagreed. In his dissent
Judge Hill chose to look at the broader picture and the
purpose behind the limitations clause of the insurance
policy, along with the nature of Roberts and
Gimopoulos’ relationship, and found it unreasonable to
decide that they did not exist as a “household.” In con-
trast Judge Carnes, for the majority, decided the case
based on state legal principles and a close examination of
the language itself.
Conclusion
The court ruled that the term “household” in Roberts’
family member limitations clause was ambiguous, enti-
tling her and her passenger, Gimopoulos, to an interpre-
tation requiring relationship by blood, marriage or adop-
tion. Continental Insurance Company is not entitled to
extend the definition of “household” to cover the rela-
tionship between Gimopoulos and Roberts in determin-
ing whether the family liability coverage clause
applies.
Endnotes
1. Page references are not available for this case. All quo-
tations are from the court’s opinion. 
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2005 Alabama Legislative Update
Josh Clemons
The following is a summary of legislation enacted by the Alabama Legislature during the 2005
session that may be of interest to Water Log readers.
2005 Alabama Laws 118 (H.B. 762) Enacted May 5, 2005
Authorizes the incorporation of the Conecuh County Reservoir Management Area Authority as a public corporation
and political subdivision of the state, for the development of that portion of Murder Creek in Conecuh County and
within the Conecuh County Reservoir Management Area, its tributaries and watershed area, for the purposes of water
conservation and supply, dam construction and reservoir development, industrial development, flood control, naviga-
tion, irrigation, public recreation and related purposes. The Authority is given the powers necessary to achieve those
purposes, including eminent domain, rate setting, bond issuance, and zoning, but not taxation.
2005 Alabama Laws 176 (H.B. 709) Enacted May 5, 2005
The Tennessee River Preservation Act. In Marshall County, prohibits the withdrawal of water from the Tennessee River
Basin for transfer to any other river basin outside of the Tennessee River Basin in an amount greater than the amount
being withdrawn on the act’s effective date; for the purpose of the act, the amount of the existing transfer of water from
the Tennessee River is 150 percent the average daily amount calculated for the highest continuous 90-day period from
January 1, 2000, until the act’s effective date.
2005 Alabama Laws 180 (H.B. 134) Enacted May 16, 2005
Makes a supplemental appropriation from the Alabama Capital Improvement Trust Fund in the State Treasury to the
Alabama State Port Authority, in the amount of $80,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005.
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Lagniappe (a little something extra)
Around the Gulf...
Alabama and Mississippi stand to benefit from the Coastal Impact Assistance amendment to the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (H.R. 6) (a.k.a. the “Energy Bill”). The amendment provides for $250 million to be paid each year from 2007 to
2010 to the coastal states that have Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas production. Each state would receive a
share of the funding proportional to the percentage of total OCS oil and gas revenues that is generated off its coast.
The prospect of liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals in the Gulf continues to generate controversy, and Alabama
governor Bob Riley and Mississippi governor Haley Barbour have recently stepped into the fray. Under the Deepwater
Port Act governors have the ability to veto proposed LNG terminals in their states’ waters. In a June 16 letter to the
administrator of the U.S. Maritime Administration, Riley and Barbour expressed disapproval of the “open-loop” sys-
tem that some companies propose because of the costly toll such systems may take on marine life.
The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council has placed a ten-year moratorium on new offshore shrimp licenses.
A license obtained from NOAA Fisheries (previously the National Marine Fisheries Service) prior to December 6, 2003
is now required to shrimp federal waters. While new licenses will not be issued, old licenses are transferable.
The Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) has issued the state’s 2004 list of impaired water
bodies, as required by § 303(d) of the Clean Water Act. The new list will be used for, among other things, the devel-
opment of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants. The list replaces the 2002 list. The list may be viewed
at and downloaded from the MDEQ website at http://deq.state.ms.us/ under the topic “TMDLs.”
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been active in recent months:
• EPA announced that each state will receive an additional $172,000 in federal funding for water quality monitoring
in fiscal year 2005. The EPA awards the states water pollution control grants under § 106 of the Clean Water Act.
For more information, please visit http://www.epa.gov/owm/cwfinance/altformula.htm.
• The agency has published a technical guidance and reference document entitled National Management Measures to
Control Nonpoint Source Pollution from Forestry to help industry, government, and the public reduce the water pol-
lution impacts of forestry activities. More information, along with the guidance document itself, is available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/forestrymgmt/.
• In an effort to curb excessive water use, EPA is increasing its focus on water efficiency. The agency’s website at
http://www.epa.gov/owm/water-efficiency/ contains a wealth of information on ways to use water more wisely in
the home, in your yard, and at your business, as well is advice for industries and communities.
• EPA, along with the National Endowment for the Arts, is funding the Governors’ Institute on Community Design
to help the states with “smart growth.” Over the coming year the Institute will conduct workshops at which state
leaders will consult with planning experts on smart growth strategies. The goal is development that benefits (or at
least does minimal damage to) public health, the economy, and the environment. More information about the
Institute is available at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/gov_institute.htm.
The world’s first commercial “wave farm” is scheduled to go on-line off the coast of Portugal in 2006. The wave
farm turns tidal energy into electricity by raising and lowering large floating cylinders that pump high-pressure flu-
ids to drive hydraulic motors. The motors will produce 2.25 megawatts of electricity in three generators, enough to
power about 1,500 Portuguese homes. The plant will be located about three miles from shore. If this wave farm is
successful, similar facilities could be built in coastal areas worldwide to provide a safe, clean, renewable, and reliable
source of energy.
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• • • Upcoming Conferences • • •
•SEPTEMBER 2005 •
2005 Plastic Debris, Rivers to Sea Conference
September 7, 2005, Redondo Beach, CA
http://www.plasticdebris.org
2005 Alabama Water Resources Conference
September 7-9, 2005, Orange Beach, AL
http://www.auei.auburn.edu
Ocean 2005 Conference: One Ocean
September 19-23, 2005, Washington, D.C.
http://www.oceans2005.org
Dam Safety 2005
September 25-28, 2005, New Orleans, LA
http://www.damsafety.org
•OCTOBER 2005 •
2nd Int’l Sustainable Marine Fish Culture Conference &Workshop
October 19-21, 2005, Fort Pierce, FL
http://www.sustainableaquaculture.org
1st Int’l Congress on Marine Protected Areas
October 23-27, 2005, Geelong, VIC, Australia
http://www.impacongress.org
WEFTEC.05: The Water Quality Event 
October 29, 2005, Washington, DC
http://www.weftec.org
